



Report Working Group 4:

Development of the Comprehensive Approach

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ABSTRACT

As part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Research and Technology Organisation (RTO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Workshop (RWS) on Collaboration in a Comprehensive Approach to Operations, several working groups were tasked with addressing specific aspects of the comprehensive approach (CA). Working Group 4 discussed strategies for developing or implementing CA. In particular, this Working Group addressed the following three issues: (1) how to achieve transformation toward effective CA; (2) how to better train and prepare for CA and involve all actors; and (3) what competencies are relevant for CA and how should these be developed. As part of this discussion, the Working Group also proposed seven pillars for effective CA transformation and development. This chapter summarizes the resulting discussions and presentation brief generated by this Group.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

As part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Research and Technology Organisation (RTO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Workshop (RWS) on Collaboration in a Comprehensive Approach to Operations, several working groups were tasked with addressing specific aspects of the comprehensive approach (CA). Working Group 4 discussed strategies for developing or implementing effective CA. In particular, this Working Group addressed the following three issues: (1) how to achieve transformation toward effective CA; (2) how to better train and prepare for CA and involve all relevant actors; and (3) what competencies are relevant for CA, and how these should be developed. As part of this discussion, the Working Group also proposed seven pillars for effective CA transformation and development. This chapter summarizes the resulting discussions and presentation brief generated by this Group.

2.0 STARTING POINTS AND DEFINITIONS: WHO, WHAT, HOW?

As a starting point, the Working Group discussed several "who" questions when considering the development and implementation of CA. Specifically, the Group considered the questions of who is the audience, who are the relevant actors, and who has the authority when considering the development of CA. The Group then considered several "what" questions, including what is meant by effective CA and what would need to be transformed or developed within the context of CA. Finally, the Group considered a "how" question, namely: how to ensure that the development of CA is not performed within "in a vacuum" (in other words, CA is developed within a particular context).



Concerning the who questions, the Group determined that the audience is International Military Staff (IMS); that internal actors are governmental/military, governmental/civilian, and host nation members; and that external actors are members of non-governmental international organisations (such as United Nations organisations), academics/researchers, and members of private organisations. Concerning what is effective CA, it was proposed by the Group that "effective" means achieving the different goals laid out by internal actors in concert with the host nation. Accordingly, effective CA implies the achievement of such goals.

The Working Group also considered the definition of CA. The position taken by the Group was that a definition of CA was still to be determined via NATO. As a working definition, however, the Group adopted the definition of CA that Brigadier-General Stephen Bowes had articulated in his Workshop keynote address within the operational context of the Afghanistan mission. As seen in Figure 1, this working definition involved concepts such as building governance, development and security capacity through partnership; building trust; enhancing cooperation; increasing stability; and increasing accountability and responsiveness to the needs of the local population. In addition, the Group considered the definition of CA that was proposed by the CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCoE) during the NATO First Stakeholders Meeting on CA (23 September 2010). According to this definition, CA refers to the "the synergy amongst all actors and actions of the International Community through the coordination and de-confliction of its political, development and security capabilities to face today's challenges including complex emergencies." This definition was further considered by the Group to be an "international" and all-inclusive definition.



Figure 17 - 1: Operational Perspective on the Comprehensive Approach



3.0 EFFECTING TRANSFORMATION TO CA: SEVEN PILLARS

The members of Working Group 4 then proceeded to discuss the topic of effecting transformation to CA. It was proposed that transformation to CA could be brought about through the following seven pillars (see Box). Each of these seven pillars is elaborated below.

| 1. | Lessons Learned. | 7. Four modes of civil-military |
|----|-------------------------------|--|
| 2. | Concept Development. | interaction to achieve desired effects external to NATO: |
| 3. | Doctrine. | a. Deconflict. |
| 4. | Training and Education. | b. Coordinate |
| 5. | Staff Selection/Competencies. | c. Cooperate. |
| 6. | Organisational Structure. | d. Integrate. |
| | | 5 |
| | | |

3.1 LESSONS LEARNED.

Lessons Learned were considered a two-way street. Such lessons could be gleaned from historical examples, with academia and NATO – Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) playing a role in identifying such examples, and from country Lessons Learned databases. The Group proposed that it was important to develop a common format/technique (possibly Standardized Operating Procedures or SOPs) for processing existing lessons and for creating new lessons. For instance, it was suggested that SOPs could be created whereby Lessons Learned are fed to NATO membership and Partners-for-Peace (PfP) nations. The Working Group also raised the question of whether there would be cross-national (or cross-NATO) security issues relevant to Lessons Learned, and whether there should be developed through feedback, implementation, and application.

3.2 CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT.

The Working Group referred to the NATO definition of a concept, according to which a concept is "a notion or statement of an idea, expressing how something might be done or accomplished, that may lead to an accepted procedure (AAP-6, 2008, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2-C-12). Concept development (or "the what"), involves addressing the question of: knowing what we know now, how should we do it (CA) in the future? Concept development also involves putting into one document that which will describe in general terms the operational approach to be adapted and that is applicable across all mission types, independent of the specific operational context. Concept development also requires an accepted notion (within NATO) of how CA may be done; such a notion must be achieved through consensus, it must involve enduring principles, and it must be "authoritative."

3.3 DOCTRINE.

The Working Group noted that, currently within NATO, gaps exist at all levels regarding doctrine (or "the how") on CA. At the strategic/political level (e.g., the NATO Military Committee), as well as at lower levels, instructions regarding CA are lacking. It was proposed that CA should be reflected in doctrine across all levels concurrently.



3.4 TRAINING AND EDUCATION.

This pillar was considered by members of Working Group 4 to be particularly relevant. They further felt that CA was not adequately reflected in training, and that CA needs to be accorded institutional and cultural permanence, rather than be dependent on personal networks. It was also thought that civilian subject-matter experts (SMEs) needed to be integrated within training and exercises in a variety of roles, including as co-designers/training developers, as members of the primary training audience, as actors/role players, and as evaluators. Accordingly, joint civil-military training (e.g., that includes NATO and non-NATO actors) should be conducted.

In terms of education, the Working Group members proposed that a Centre of Excellence be implemented, and that standards to ensure common CA-related instruction be developed. In addition, the Working Group suggested that a CA course be developed for both the NATO Defence College and the NATO School of Oberammergau, in which CA principles are introduced.

3.5 STAFF SELECTION/COMPETENCIES.

In regards to staff selection and competencies related to CA, it was thought by the Working Group that language and "bits of culture" are necessary but not sufficient competencies for effective CA performance. In addition, the Group proposed that it was important to create a staff (or multi-team system) that collectively (if not individually) possesses all CA-relevant competencies, and to recognize the dynamic nature of CA – that it requires flexible human resources and assignment practices. It was further suggested that career milestones be defined that enable career progression for different CA-relevant roles, and that different levels of CA-related competency map onto different levels of CA engagement.

Some of the CA-related competencies proposed by the Working Group included influencing; communication; diplomacy; flexibility; being people-oriented; being situationally and culturally aware; cooperating; being a visionary; and being self-reflective/learning capable. However, many other CA-relevant competencies may also exist (see Figure 2).






Figure 17 - 2: Sample CA Competencies

3.6 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE.

The Working Group proposed that the kind of organisational structure that best suits CA is situationdependent. For example, the organisational structure requirements for civil emergencies may be different from those required for counterinsurgencies. Further, it was suggested that CA could be enabled through flexible "mission command" organisational structures. It was also thought that traditional military units do not fit the current situation or the demands of CA. Some alternative NATO structures or concepts that may better fit current needs include "the strategic corporal," "stabilization companies" or "mission teams" (which may consist of, e.g., a major, an infantry platoon, a military police platoon, and civil affairs personnel), and, in some instances, "all-female" platoons.

3.7 FOUR MODES OF CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION: DECONFLICT, COORDINATE, COOPERATE, INTEGRATE.

The previous six pillars described what is needed for effective CA that is *internal* to NATO (Lessons Learned, concept development, doctrine, training and education, staff selection/competencies, and organisational structures). However, the situation or context will prescribe the appropriate level of civilmilitary interaction *externally*. That level of interaction may be characterized as de-confliction, coordination, cooperation, integration, or some other term.¹ The Working Group also proposed that a better understanding of such levels of interaction will be needed in order to facilitate effective CA.

¹ For example, Fritz-Millet (this volume) suggests the use of the terms compete, coerce, avoid, coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate to describe increasing levels of interaction between military and civilian organizations.



4.0 CONCLUSION

This chapter summarized the discussions of Working Group 4 in regards to strategies for developing or implementing effective CA. In particular, this Working Group addressed the following three issues: (1) how to achieve transformation toward effective CA; (2) how to better train and prepare for CA and involve all relevant actors; and (3) what competencies are relevant for CA and how should these be developed. As such, the Working Group proposed seven pillars for effective CA transformation and development (Lessons Learned, concept development, doctrine, training and education, staff selection/competencies, organisational structures, and modes of effective civil-military interaction).